Author: Shenchao TechFlow
On November 16, Layer 1 public blockchain Kava Chain officially released a security handling update: its lending application HARD Lend suffered an attack. The attacker transferred approximately 53.9 million KAVA from the lending pool, worth about $1.83 million.
The Kava team has urgently patched the contract vulnerability and joined forces with multiple parties to trace the funds, while also launching a 7-day community governance proposal to permanently shut down HARD Lend's new lending business and implement orderly wind-down and redemption guidance for existing positions.
Accounting Vulnerability in Dormant BUSD Accounts Becomes Attack Breakthrough
According to details disclosed in Kava's official security handling announcement, this attack originated from an accounting vulnerability in the dormant BUSD collateral market within HARD Lend's lending accounts. This historical market had long been in a low-activity dormant state, yet retained its original collateral pricing logic.
The attacker exploited the pricing flaw to artificially inflate the book value of BUSD collateral within the lending account. Leveraging the inflated amount, the attacker repeatedly executed borrowing and liquidation cycles, draining the available liquidity from the fund pool and illegally transferring approximately 53.9 million KAVA.
Over 90% of Stolen Tokens Sold Off via LayerZero Cross-Chain
In terms of fund transfer paths, the attacker adopted a rapid cross-chain monetization strategy. On-chain data shows that approximately 49.2 million of the stolen tokens were subsequently transferred to BNB Chain via the LayerZero official cross-chain explorer and sold off, with a cross-chain ratio of 91.28%.
Facing the outflow of funds, the Kava team located the vulnerability and triggered risk controls immediately upon discovering the anomaly, successfully blocking further outflow of funds. As of November 16, some of the involved funds have been successfully frozen at centralized exchanges and cross-chain bridge endpoints.
Currently, Kava contributors are working with ecosystem security teams, mainstream trading platforms, and law enforcement agencies to continuously conduct on-chain tracing and judicial recovery of funds flowing to BNB Chain, making every effort to compress the attacker's monetization space and advance asset recovery.
Attack Strictly Isolated to Application Layer, Mainnet Consensus Unaffected
Regarding the underlying network security of community concern, Kava clearly delineated the risk boundary: this incident was strictly confined to a single application-layer contract of HARD Lend, and did not affect Kava Chain's underlying consensus mechanism or blockchain network infrastructure; no unauthorized token minting occurred at the protocol's underlying layer.
By promptly isolating contract permissions, the security losses were fully locked within the legacy lending fund pool. Block production and cross-chain communication of validation nodes across the network maintained normal operation, and the vast majority of other independently deployed decentralized applications in the ecosystem and ordinary users' personal on-chain deposits were entirely unaffected.
Launching Seven-Day Community Governance to Completely Shut Down New Lending Business
To thoroughly eliminate historical technical debt, the Kava team is accelerating the deprecation of legacy functions and has officially launched a 7-day community governance proposal. If the vote passes, HARD Lend will permanently shut down new lending business, and existing positions will be wound down in phases in an orderly manner according to guidance.
External audits and independent institutions' investigation of legacy contracts have become an industry consensus. According to the community timetable, this permanent shutdown proposal will be formally executed after the 7-day voting period ends, providing a typical reference example for the code retirement and risk handling of subsequent multi-asset lending protocols.







